Application of Rule of Strict Interpretation to Penal Statutes

I. Introduction

Strict interpretation according to Crawford is “ If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should be included within its scope that does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used. Its language must be given exact and technical meaning with no extension on account of implications or equitable considerations; or has been aptly asserted, its operation must be confined to cases coming clearly within the letter of the statute as well as within its spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it is close and conservative adherence to the literal or textual interpretation”². As per the strict interpretation rule, each and every word in the enactment must be construed according to the text of the law, with the spirit of the law being ignored. The judiciary has to go by the letter while interpreting any penal or taxing statute. In applying the rule of strict interpretation, the judiciary uses the literal rule of interpretation.

The concept of strict interpretation was brought in the common law country of the UK when there had been irrational punishment like amputation for stealing and to reduce this form of punishment the legislature wanted to bring in statues which had prescribed punishments and the act which constitutes an offence and thus it insisted to follows strict construction as to follow the intent of the legislature and the wording used by them and not to extend the meaning and scope of the word by extending the meaning.

The Concept of Strict Interpretation also give the benefit to the person who is being charged with an accusation and if the act doesn’t fall within the ambit of the words used by the legislature to define the act then the person must not be convicted of that charge.

The penal laws are very serious in nature as it in a way curb the fundamental rights of the person and can also sometimes lead to a death sentence. Thus the legislature must be very much agile while constructing the provisions in the statute and the provisions must be clear and unambiguous.

II. Case laws that upheld the “strict rule of interpretation of penal statutes”

The purpose sought to be reached by the enactment should not be undermined due to procedural delays and legal difficulties, it was decided in the case of Shri Ram Singh.³

The legislative, not the court, is responsible for defining a crime and assigning punishment to it.

In Tolaram Relumal’s case, it was ruled by the court that if there are more than one possible interpretations that can be attached to a penal provision, then the court must tilt in the direction of the interpretation which discharges the alleged accused from the punishment rather than the one which imposes a penalty.⁴

The penal provisions which do not come in the ambit of expressed language, cannot be brought in by extending the language of a legal provision.⁵

In Appasaheb⁶, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a monetary claim for financial restrictions or to cover urgent household expenses or to buy manure cannot be called a dowry claim in the ordinary sense of the word. According to the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961,⁷ the definition of "dowry" include, the delivery or taking of property or security of value that should be related to the marriage of the parties, which is not present in the instant case. Therefore the applicant's dowry death conviction was reversed under Section 304B of the IPC.⁸ Here the court applied the strict rule of interpretation and the benefit was given to the accused based on the intent of the legislature.

In Kishan Chand,⁹ The Apex Court decided, in relation to Sections 42, 50 and 57 of the NDPS Act,1985¹⁰, that the pre-selection requirement to record the information received and send it to the supervisor was exact and unequivocal compliance as opposed to an essential one requires compliance. The substantial compliance concept would be applicable if the wording of the provision strictly or necessarily allows such compliance. Criminal provisions that provide for more severe penalties and that are clearly intended to be followed must be strictly interpreted. The protective measures under Sections 42, 50 and 57 are different and are not related or interdependent, adherence with one does not replace adherence necessary with the other.

In Sukhdev Singh,¹¹ there was a search conducted under NDPS Act, 1985. On receiving the information the officer in charge neither recorded it to put in the form of an F.I.R nor did he try to inform any superior and there was an unreasonable delay by the officer in registration of the F.I.R. There was in this way an absolute rebelliousness of Section 42 of the Act. The Apex Court held that such imperfection is serious and the denounced was at risk to be absolved. Criminal Jurisprudence has made a settled position that the arrangements need to be rigorously interpreted and no penal provision can be used retrospectively unless the intention and expression of the legislature are clear beyond any doubt.

So it is very clear from this plethora of cases that the main objective of this interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature and not to hold the supremacy of the judiciary.

(A) Purposive Interpretation of Penal Statutes

The Courts are not under obligation to always support the construction which is in favour of the accused and not the prosecution but the court may also select the construction which is consistent with the object mentioned in the law. The “Doctrine of Strict Interpretation” does not stand in the way of the court from interpreting a statute in accordance with its current meaning and putting in the language to cover the recent developments in science and technology which were not known when the statute was passed.

In Tapas D. Neogy,¹² the interpretation of the expression ‘any property’ in section 102 of Cr.P.C. was discussed. It was held that ‘any property’ included ‘bank account’ also. Therefore the investigating officer was justified in seizing the same.

In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya¹³, the Apex Court discussed the interpretation of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954¹⁴, to stop the wrongdoer from taking the advantage of the loopholes of the statute.

In M.U Joshi¹⁵, the facts were as stated: the petitioner was convicted under section-16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 for selling out cheap and impure butter.¹⁶ His argument was that the butter was not butter in the sense of the law, as butter meant butter that is made from milk, whereas what he had sold was butter made from cottage cheese and as the law is criminal law, the word “butter” had to be interpreted strictly in favour of the accused. The Supreme Court negated the contention that a strict construction means that the defendant's conduct must be within the clear language of criminal law to be convicted, without invading its natural meaning. If this is not the case and there are two possible reasonable designs, the lenient design should be accepted.

(B) Suppression of the Mischief

The Rule of Mischief states that the interpretation of any enactment should be done in such a way that the Mischief is suppressed. The loopholes which are present in the statute are due to make technical and scientific advancement and also change in society the judges can sometimes go with the mischief rule for interpreting specific penal statutes.

In Ganga Hire Purchase Pvt. Ltd.¹⁷, while interpreting section 60(3) of NDPS Act¹⁸, 1985, the word ‘owner’ was interpreted in a broader sense as for confiscating the vehicle although the accused was in the hire and purchase agreement of the vehicle and has not paid all the instalment of the vehicle then also he was considered to be the owner of the same to meet the ends of justice.

In Reema Aggarwal¹⁹, “the court attached a broader meaning to the application of sections 304B and 498A of the IPC²⁰, in light of the increasing cases of illegitimate marriage where it was becoming difficult to prove that the accused is a legitimate husband of the victim but there has been a prima facie case against the accused”. So the judges had to shift from the strict rule of interpretation just to do justice to the intent of the lawmakers.

III. Summary of rules dealing with the interpretation of penal statutes

1. When there is a new way of punishing an individual given in a penal enactment which is enacted later, for instance, when there is an alteration of punishment of fine to that of imprisonment, then there is an aggregate of both the provisions considered.

2. The earlier enactment is implicitly considered to be repealed if two different statutes relating to punishment are in force. For instance, when there is an alteration of the penalty of a fine of the lesser amount to that of a larger amount, the earlier provision is repealed.

3. When a later enacted provision provides for a novel form of procedure, for instance “when the procedure for trial of a non-cognizable offence is altered to the procedure for trial of a cognizable one, the two Acts are regarded as cumulative.”

4. If there is any change in the procedure as to a right of appeal is given when none existed earlier, an implied repeal of the previous enactment is considered.

5. A repeal of the older legislation is inferred when the significance or circumstances of an existing offence change.

6. The clause concerning offences punishable by two or more enactments is dealt with in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. It states that “if an act or omission is punishable under two or more statutes, the offender may be tried and punished under each or all of the statutes, but may not be penalized twice for the same offence.”

7. There are several statutes forbidding specific behaviour in today's welfare state. Remedial legislation is one in which the legislature simply declares an act to be illegal and gives money as restitution to the offended party. Legislation is classified as a punitive statute if it includes consequences for violation of the laws, such as jail or a penalty.

8. Remedial action should be read generously, which means that if there is a question regarding its meaning, it should be settled in favour of the class of people who were supposed to benefit from it. A criminal act, on the other hand, is rigidly interpreted, which means that if there is any dispute, the issue is resolved in favour of the defendant.

9. In some ways, legislation can be criminal and in others, it can be rehabilitative. Furthermore, both the punitive and rehabilitative parts of the law may be included in the same act. The rule of interpreting in this circumstance is as follows: It's important to remember that, while the statute and rules have a good intention of protecting a certain group of people, breaking them carries a penalty; and where penalties are imposed, it's not appropriate to stretch the rule's language beyond its fair and ordinary significance, no matter how good the actual intent.

IV. Conclusion

It is obvious that the Penal Statues must be interpreted by the rule of strict interpretation but the real objective of all forms of interpretation is to find the true intent of the legislature and to give effect to it. It is true that criminal statutes must be clear and unambiguous, but with changing times and in this fast-paced society, it is impossible to introduce new legislation or amendments at the same rate as the typology and techniques of crime change, so the judiciary must play a critical role in correctly interpreting the statutes and determining the true intent of the legislators.

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Footnotes

1. Author is a student at KIIT School of Law, India.

2. Interpretation of Penal Statutes, Interpretation of Tax Statutes, accessed on: ( Oct.17, 2021, 3:15 PM) http://law.uok.edu.in/Files/5ce6c765-c013-446c-b6ac-b9de496f8751/Custom/Interpretation_UNIT_IV.pdf ↩

3. AIR 2000 SC 575 ↩

4. AIR 1954 SC 496 ↩

5. Sanjay Dutt v. State , (1994) 5 SCC 402 ↩

6. Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 ↩

7. Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 ↩

8. Indian Penal Code, § 304B ↩

9. Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 502 ↩

10. Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 ↩

11. Sukhdev Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 212 ↩

12. State Of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685 ↩

13. Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1976 SC 1929). ↩

14. Food Adulteration Act 1954 ↩

15. M.U Joshi v. M. V Shimpi (AIR 1961 SC 1494) ↩

16. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, § 16 ↩

17. Ganga Hire Purchase Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab and Ors., (1999) 5 SCC 670 ↩

18. Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 § 60 ↩

19. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199 ↩

20. Indian Penal Code 1860 § 304B § 498A ↩