Combating Modern Maritime Piracy off Somalia Relevance of International Law and International Institutions

I. Introduction

The sea is a vital highway for the continued growth of the world trade. Piracy has been a threat to the mankind since the time humans have started navigating through the waters and it is still a major threat to trade and commerce in various parts of the world. Exposure of the vast areas of unprotected waters have always left the ships defenceless and it is this vulnerability that has always let maritime piracy cherish since the ancient times. Unfortunately, the security and order at sea has always been threatened by various criminal activities like piracy and armed robbery against ships. These crimes are considered plague for the maritime law since the time seaborne trade has been established. Maritime piracy and armed robbery against the ships have had their own shares of ups and downs depending on the era and region.

In this globalised world where most of the international trade takes place through the oceans, it becomes paramount to protect these waters in order for the smooth functioning of the international trade. Not only international trade but these waters are home to many activities which survive life on the land. Thus. Making maritime piracy a universal crime that imposes duty on all the states to suppress it.

Considered the crime of past, Piracy has re-emerged in recent years in the Gulf of Aden and off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen reaching widespread proportions and booming in the socio-economic and political chaos of Somalia. The issue of piracy has never been completely eradicated not only this, but these numbers have been steadily increasing in the various parts of the world especially off the coast of Somalia.

Despite operating in the vicinity of superior military forces on the water, Somali pirates remain capable of hijacking ships because they have adjusted their tactics. Naval forces and the shipping industry have likewise adjusted their tactics to address this evolving threat. Effectively confronting Somali pirates and maintaining public order in the maritime domain is particularly challenging because the operating space exceeds two million square miles, extensive land-based hurdles, and complex legal and judicial issues that require cooperation by a variety of countries.

There is an arrangement that piracy is a universal crime, though no agreement exists regarding whether piracy is principally a civilian or military concern, if piracy characterizes a criminal or national security threat, or whether the long lasting solution involves more economic development or dynamic action.

(A) Research questions

1. Whether the definition of piracy as provided in various international conventions is enough to combat piracy in the modern era?

2. Whether such a legal regime has been effective in combating the problem of piracy in Somalia?

(B) Review of Literature

Articles referred to

Christopher Joyner, 'Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism' (2009) Vol. 10, No. 2 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 83: This article explains in detail explains why these acts of piracy are occurring offshore Somalia. It then evaluates how this dramatic escalation in attacks both adversely affects international shipping and confuses the legal conception of piracy under modern international law. Finally, the piece offers some modest recommendations for multinational action that could contribute to suppressing shipping in the twenty-first century is marked by violence, professional organization, and sophisticated planning.

Vishal Surbun, 'The developing jurisprudence to combat modern maritime piracy: a crime of the high seas?' (2010) Vol. 43 No. 1 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1: ted. This article illustrates the shortcomings of UNCLOS by briefly examining the trends in recent reported piracy incidents This article accordingly suggests that a review of the ambit and scope of the piracy definition of UNCLOS is necessary to successfully combat

Captain Brian Wilson, 'THE SOMALI PIRACY CHALLENGE: OPERATIONAL PARTNERING, THE RULE OF LAW, AND CAPACITY BUILDING' (2012) Volume 9, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 45: this article provides a deeper understanding of the problem of the Somalian piracy along with the understanding of the legal frameworks available to prosecute the pirates that have been caught by the states.

Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93: This article argues that the major problem in combating modern maritime piracy is the complex regime itself. It deeply examines four core elemental regimes that are identifiable by their key texts or organizations: the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Maritime Bureau.

J. Ashley Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions' (2010) Vol. 104, No. 3 The American Journal of International Law 397: Specific issues in the international law of piracy and related international criminal law instruments as they affect the counter piracy effort off Somalia are first examined in this essay. The second part deals with the role international institutions have played in that effort. The essay concludes with a brief discussion on the role of national legislation in suppressing piracy.

(C) Scope

The scope of this article is to deal with the present legal system in place to deal with piracy. The article deals with the provisions of UNCLOS and the convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. It also analyses the role of international maritime organisation and international maritime bureau in dealing with the Somalian pirates. This article does not deal with the fundamental causes of why these pirates are doing what they are doing. The article also does not deal with the legal system that is being used to prosecute the pirates once captured.

(D) Objective

Dealing with pirates off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean over the past few years has emphasized on the international law relevant to countering piracy at sea and the role of international institutions in that effort. This article seeks to understand the same and also provide a deeper understanding to the provisions of piracy and its relevance in modern day.

(E) Hypothesis

The legal framework put in place for the issue of piracy has been ineffective in dealing with the troubled waters off the coast of Somalia.

(F) Research methodology

The research methodology used for this article is qualitative and descriptive which aims at understanding the present legal situation and also how it has helped the situation in Somalia. The author has referred to various conventions and codes in order to understand the legal framework in place for combating piracy. Secondary sources such as scholarly articles or newspaper reporting’s have been used to assess the impact of these legal frameworks on the existing issue.

II. United nations legal frameworks related to piracy

Maritime piracy of a gross violation of international law and is a universal crime that imposes duty on all states to cooperate. While various international treaties forbid piracy, seizing control of a ship and taking hostages, indicting piracy remains a particularly problematic both in operational and legal ways.

(A) Piracy and UNCLOS

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),² the framework for peacetime maritime security cooperation, defines piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention, or depredation, committed outside of territorial waters for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship, person or crew.³ This definition of piracy in the LOS Convention emerged not only from customary international law but also from the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. If the crime has been committed inside the territorial waters of the coastal country then it becomes the responsibility of the coastal state to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes and thus, the other countries do not enjoy the principle of universal jurisdiction.

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is a broad-based regime that balances the goal of maintaining freedom of navigation on the seas with ensuring the rights of states to regulate their territorial waters and merchant marine fleets and to ensure the orderly use of natural resources. Two central norms define that balance. The first grants free passage to ships in international waters and gives coastal states exclusive jurisdiction in their territorial waters. The second is the flag-state system, a deeply entrenched norm that extends a state's legal jurisdiction to ships flying its flag on the oceans. Under UNCLOS, each vessel has a flag state, is subject to the regulations of only that state when in international waters and must maintain that flag for the duration of a cruise. Within those parameters, there is substantial room for cooperation on counterpiracy. UNCLOS generally obliges states to cooperate in the repression of piracy⁴ (Article 100) and grants them the right to seize pirate vessels, arrest pirates, seize property on board, and determine appropriate punishment in national courts of the seizing state⁵ (Article 105). In order to prevent international law crimes, including maritime piracy, UNCLOS also allows warships of any state to approach commercial vessels in order to determine their nationality and to board commercial ships on the high seas, irrespective of their national flag. Since the obligatory force of Article 100 is vague, UNCLOS is mostly tolerant of state conduct but mandates little. The definition of piracy cited above shifts from the general rule with the significance that the ‘jurisdiction of all states may be asserted to pursue, capture and punish the perpetrator of such an act and to seize and condemn the pirate ship. Jurisdiction is not confined to the countries whose subjects or interests have been directly affected.’⁶ This definition also does not mention attempts, conspiracy to commit piracy, aiding and abetting the commission of acts of piracy, or accessory after the fact.

(B) Piracy and SUA convention

The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), which proscribes the unlawful seizure or control of a vessel by force or threat or other form of intimidation, also provides legal authority to punish piratical acts.⁷ The 166 State parties to the SUA Convention embody almost 95 percent of the gross tonnage amongst the world’s merchant fleets, thus, making it imperative for these nations to have safety mechanism to deal with issues related to piracy. Hijacking of the Achille Lauro by politically motivated militants was the event that led to formation of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.⁸

While the SUA Convention has been ratified by over 150 states as of 2010. The convention has several provisions that make it a potentially valuable counterpiracy tool. The two of criminal offenses provided under the SUA Convention are predominantly relevant to the issue of maritime piracy. The convention makes it an offense when a person unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation, or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.⁹ Legally, there are many attacks that can be qualified as acts of piracy under the SUA Convention. According to this convention states agree to cooperate to ensure that individuals responsible for such offenses or even suspected of committing such an offence will be arrested and prosecuted if they enter the territory state that is party to the convention, including the territorial waters of such states. According to the IMO, the convention's main purpose is to ensure appropriate consequences for aggression toward ships. These duties are mandatory in nature for states, unlike the lenient language of UNCLOS.

(C) Piracy and Other Conventions

Along with the LOS Convention and the SUA Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) also offer supplementary legal frameworks for prosecutions of pirates. UNTOC was adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 on November 15, 2000 and entered into force September 29, 2003. The UNTOC has three protocols,¹⁰ demanding that State parties:

[1] commit themselves to taking a series of measures against transnational organized crime, including the creation of domestic criminal offences (participation in an organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of justice);

[2] the adoption of new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance and law enforcement cooperation; and

[3] the promotion of training and technical assistance for building or upgrading the necessary capacity of national authorities.¹¹

The Hostages Convention was adopted December 17, 1979 and entered into force on June 3, 1983. With regard to piracy, the hostage convention applies: To the offense of direct involvement or complicity in the seizure or detention of, and threat to kill, injure, or continue to detain a hostage, whether actual or attempt, in order to compel a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a person, or a group of persons to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.¹²

Provided there is national legislation that is a challenge for several nations along with the convergence of treaties and appropriate jurisdictional provisions allow prosecution for the act of threatening to seize a ship, firing at a ship, seizing control of a ship, stealing from passengers, stealing cargo, re-flagging a ship, holding hostages, and/or securing ransom. Carrying of criminalizing equipment that is used for piracy has no consensus in the international community, but this problem could be solved through the inclusion of additional elements in the national legislation. Because of issues associated with piracy legislation, including geography and jurisdiction as well as capacity, some countries have recommended the development of a multilateral instrument to combat piracy or, alternatively, the development of model legislation.¹³ In view of currently existing international treaties, a multilateral instrument is not necessary, though model legislation would be beneficial. As the international comes to understanding of the present issue of piracy of the coast of the Somalia, several issues with regard to the present legal framework of deal which deals with piracy have come to light. They are issues with regards to the geographical location, scope of the punishable actions, and the rights and duties of states apprehending and trying the suspected pirates.¹⁴

III. International institutions and piracy

(A) The International Maritime Organisation:

Established in the year 1959, The International Maritime Organization is an united nations specialised body, with the fundamental purpose of providing a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping that addresses safety, environmental, legal, technical, and efficiency concerns¹⁵. This purpose is accomplished through the negotiation of international treaties or through the declaration of best practice standards for the industry. IMO has the responsibility of the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships.

Assembly is the highest authority under IMO. It consists of all the 174 member states¹⁶, the primary function of which is to recommend treaties for adoption by member states. The IMO also institutionalizes collaboration with the shipping industry by allowing industry associations and other private groups to enter consultative status with the IMO. The mandate of IMO was originally limited to safety-related issues in the shipping industry but, subsequently, its responsibility expanded to embrace environmental considerations, legal matters and technical cooperation. IMO in the present times also addresses issues that affect the overall efficiency of shipping – such as how to deal with stowaways or how a cargo manifest should be transmitted to the authorities ashore, as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships and maritime security. Given that the major flag states, major commercial trading states, and major naval powers are all represented in this nearly universal intergovernmental organization, the IMO would seem to be a logical place to have a broad-based intergovernmental dialogue about repressing maritime piracy¹⁷.

IMO has been involved in deliberating piracy since 1983. It has passed a number of nonbinding resolutions calling on states to cooperate in the capture and prosecution of pirates, called for binding regional treaties to facilitate piracy repression, and fomented the discussions that led to UN Security Council action on Somali piracy in 2008 and 2009.¹⁸ However, the focus on consensual norm building at IMO seems to make it an unlikely place to pressure states and other actors to take costly, but more effective, actions against maritime piracy.¹⁹

The Djibouti Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, additionally alluded to as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, was embraced on 29 January 2009 by the delegates of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have since marked carrying the aggregate to 20 nations from the 21 qualified to sign. Under the Code, which became compelling from the date it was marked, signatories completely announce their aim to co-work in the restraint of theft and outfitted burglary against ships. Specifically, the signatories to the Code have consented to co-work, in a way reliable with universal law, in:

(a) the examination, capture and arraignment of people, who are sensibly associated with having submitted demonstrations of theft and furnished burglary against ships, including those affecting or purposefully encouraging such acts;

(b) the ban and seizure of suspect boats and property on board such ships;

(c) the salvage of boats, people and property subject to theft and furnished burglary and the help of appropriate consideration, treatment and repatriation of sailors, anglers, other shipboard staff and travellers subject to such acts, especially the individuals who have been exposed to viciousness; and

(d) the lead of shared activities – both among signatory States and with naval forces from nations outside the area –, for example, assigning law implementation or other approved authorities to set out on watch boats or flying machine of another signatory.

The Djibouti Code of Conduct that has been instrumental in curbing theft and equipped burglary against ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has seen its extension fundamentally widened to cover other unlawful sea exercises, including human dealing and illicit, unreported and unregulated (IUU) angling.

An elevated level gathering of signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (10 to 12 January 2017) had embraced a changed Code of Conduct, which is also known as the "Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 2017".

In this gathering the participatory states consented to cooperate, with help from IMO and different partners, to assemble national and local ability to address more extensive oceanic security issues, as a source for sustainable advancement of the maritime sector.

The Jeddah Amendment recognises the significant role of the "blue economy" in supporting the sustainable economic growth, stability and prosperity of any country. Be that as it may, it communicates profound worry about violations of piracy, armed robbery against ships and other illegal sea action, including fisheries wrongdoing, in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Such acts present grave perils to the wellbeing and security of people and ships adrift and to the assurance of the marine condition.

The modified set of principles expands on the previous Code, which was embraced under the sponsorship of IMO in 2009. The Jeddah Amendment completely approaches the signatory states to cooperate to repress transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and other illegal activities at sea.

This will incorporate data sharing; prohibiting ships and additionally air ship associated with taking part in such wrongdoings; guaranteeing that any people submitting or proposing to submit such illegal action are captured and charged; and encouraging legitimate consideration, treatment, and repatriation for sailors, anglers, other shipboard work force and travellers involved as unfortunate casualties or victims.

(B) The International Maritime Bureau:

International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the international chamber of commerce. court. The Piracy Reporting Centre of IMB is an independent, non-governmental agency based in Kuala Lampur with the main aim of providing awareness within the shipping industry of high risk areas with pirate attacks and specific ports/anchorages where armed robberies on board ships have occurred and a 24-hr free service to ship masters to report piracy²⁰. Established in 1992, this specialised division for piracy reporting centre has become an increasingly important part of the antipiracy regime complex. The IMB's primary goal with the Piracy Reporting Centre is to become "the first point of contact for the shipmaster" in the event of an attack²¹. It then works to ensure that the appropriate authorities are notified. More generally, the Piracy Reporting Centre aims to serve as a producer of information and draws on maritime experts and industry insiders to remain up to date in its information. It also aims to disseminate that information as widely as possible in an effort to generate political will to deal with issues of maritime fraud.

IV. Conclusion

The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and neighbouring regions from pirates operating off the shores of lawless Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. Over the past few years numerous international security organizations as well as national governments have organized many separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region.²² Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, this mishmash of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives has had only a limited effect.²³ These various contingents typically have conflicting mandates and rules of engagement. They have also become fixated on responding to immediate problems rather than organizing a robust regional maritime structure, which could replace the foreign fleets when they inevitably withdraw.

Spanning over the past few years, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and various national governments have organized many multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Horn of Africa region. Indian Navy, which plays a crucial role in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia coast, today said there has been no hijacking of any ship for the last two years "mainly due to the concerted efforts" of it along with the international maritime forces.²⁴ At present, the international response focuses on patrolling the sea lanes off Somalia's coast, escorting merchant vessels, and responding to distress calls.

Justifiably, these states have remained reluctant to conduct a large-scale stabilization campaign on land; the recent involvement of foreign occupiers of Somalia suggests such an operation would likely incur plentiful military and civilian casualties. Even after considering this argument the operational and diplomatic cooperation that has arisen to align action against Somali pirates is representative of a new period in international maritime security partnering. Sustaining the impressive and substantial efforts - which have made a huge positive impact on the reducing the success rate of attacks.

A lasting solution to the Somali piracy problem will require the beginning of a stable government that can enforce domestic law and order along the country's coasts as well as revive the economy. Various other avenues are required to be developed in order to reduce the appeal of piracy to the Somalian people. A government for the stability of the people of Somalia is unlikely to develop soon, but if and when it takes shape, the United States and other countries will need to support it with foreign aid, security assistance, and diplomatic outreach, including by promoting its engagement with regional and other multinational institutions.

*****

V. Bibliography

• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.ht m> Accessed on 26 September 2019
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA CONVENTION) 1988
• United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) 2000
• International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention), opened for signature Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34^th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/ 46 (1979) (entered into force June 3, 1983).
• Christopher Joyner, 'Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism' (2009) Vol. 10, No. 2 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 83.
• Vishal Surbun, 'The developing jurisprudence to combat modern maritime piracy: a crime of the high seas?' (2010) Vol. 43 No. 1 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1
• Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93
• J. Ashley Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions' (2010) Vol. 104, No. 3 The American Journal of International Law 397
• Captain Brian Wilson, 'The Somali Piracy Challenge: Operational Partnering, The Rule of Law, And Capacity Building' (2012) Volume 9, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 45
• Kraska and Wilson, ‘Maritime Piracy in East Africa’ (2009) Vol.62 No.2 Journal of International Affairs 55 IMO, ‘Structure of IMO’ (IMO website) <http://www.imo .org/en/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed on 27 September 2019
• ICC CES, ‘IMB Piracy Reporting Centre’ (ICC Website) <https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre> accessed on 27 September 2019
• Economic times, ‘No hijacking of any ship for last two years on anti-piracy watch: Indian Navy’ (economic times, 2018) <//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5 0013756.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> accessed on 29 September 2019 "Djibouti Code of Conduct", 2019.

Footnotes

1. Author is a student at Alliance School of Law, Alliance University, Bangalore, India.

2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm> Accessed on 26 September 2019 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. ↩

3. Ibid. Art.101 (defining piracy as consisting of the following acts, “(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”). ↩

4. Ibid. 4 Article 100 states, “Duty to Cooperate in the repression of piracy: All states shall cooperate to the fully possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” ↩

5. Ibid. 4 Article 105 (On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.) ↩

6. J. Ashley Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions' (2010) Vol. 104, No. 3 The American Journal of International Law 397 ↩

7. Convention for The Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Of Violence Against The Safety Of Maritime Navigation (Sua Convention) 1988 [hereinafter SUA convention] ↩

8. J. Ashley Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions' (2010) Vol. 104, No. 3 The American Journal of International Law 397 ↩

9. Article 3 of SUA convention 1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally: 1. seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation; or 2. performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 3. destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 4. places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or 5. destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or 6. communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or 7. injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (f). 2. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 1. attempts to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1; or 2. abets the commission of any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is otherwise an accomplice of a person who commits such an offence; or 3. threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the offences set forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship in question. ↩

10. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) 2000 ↩

11. The three protocols “target specific areas and manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.” ↩

12. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention), opened for signature Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 146 (XXXIV), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/ 46 (1979) (entered into force June 3, 1983). ↩

13. J. Ashley Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia: International Law and International Institutions' (2010) Vol. 104, No. 3 The American Journal of International Law 397 ↩

14. Ibid 7 ↩

15. Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93 ↩

16. IMO, ‘Structure of IMO’ (IMO website) <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed on 27 September 2019 ↩

17. Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93 ↩

18. Kraska and Wilson, ‘Maritime Piracy in East Africa’ (2009) Vol.62 No.2 Journal of International Affairs 55 ↩

19. Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93 ↩

20. ICC CES, ‘IMB Piracy Reporting Centre’ (ICC Website) <https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre> accessed on 27 September 2019 ↩

21. Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, 'Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex' (2013) Vol.19 No.1 Global Governance 93 ↩

22. Christopher Joyner, 'Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism' (2009) Vol. 10, No. 2 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 83 ↩

23. Vishal Surbun, 'The developing jurisprudence to combat modern maritime piracy: a crime of the high seas?' (2010) Vol. 43 No. 1 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 1 ↩

24. Economic times , ‘No hijacking of any ship for last two years on anti-piracy watch: Indian Navy’ (economic times,2018)<//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/50013756.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> accessed on 29 September 2019 ↩