A Comprehensive Examination of Corporate Governance in an Emerging Nation

I. Introduction

The literature on corporate governance contains a wealth of definitions pertaining to corporate leadership, which can be broadly divided within corporate governance, into two categories: wide and narrow perspectives. According to Larcker et al. (2005), a more restrictive definition of corporate governance is a collection of procedures that impact managerial choices in situations when ownership and control are not combined. This term is mostly derived from the literature on agency theory, which addresses issues related to agency costs and are primarily focused on issues that develop when shareholders give management control over the company.² However, because it ignores the structural problems at the core within corporate governance, this definition of corporate governance may be completely inappropriate in many emerging and transitioning economies. One example of this is the lack of infrastructure for institutions, which is imperative that corporate governance succeed but is rare in wealthy nations. The majority of developing and emerging nations lack well-defined legal and regulatory frameworks as well as property rights. A more comprehensive definition is required to consider in order for corporate governance to be inclusive, taking into account the shortcomings of corporate governance in poor nations.

Therefore, a more inclusive corporate governance is defined as required, one that that frequently transcends the interior dynamics of the company, its owners, and its management, as well as the institutional framework, which includes political customs, the rule of law, and regulatory bodies. According to Oman et al., corporate governance is the combination of formal and informal private and governmental institutions found in a nation. These institutions regulate the interactions between corporate insiders, or those who manage firms, and other investors. These establishments comprise the nation's corporate legislation, accounting standards, security laws, and permissible business practices. It is feasible to capture the larger corporate governance's themes effects on evolving nations by describing it in this way.

Since growing nations are typified by fragile financial organisations, poorly certain property rights, inadequate minority investor protection, pervasive corruption in the governmental and private sectors, and a lack of public institutions, it is false to presume that corporate governance is unimportant for growing nations. There is nothing more limiting than this view of corporate governance. The story of developed countries has caused the framing of the corporate governance literature in relation to principal-agency problems.³ As a result, even if this explanation covers the concerns, challenges, and concerns about corporate governance in developed nations, it is unable to fully convey the complexity, difficulties, and issues connected to the growth of countries with corporate governance. This is because, in contrast to their counterparts in affluent countries, corporate governance in developing countries faces unique obstacles, impediments, and issues.

As a result, the most significant problems with corporate governance in industrialised and developing nations differ greatly from one another. The primary agency relationship issue is the main cause of corporate governance issues in industrialised nations. The creation of a corporate governance structure based on rules as opposed to one based on relationships framework that is in place now, addressing vested interests, breaking down ownership in a pyramid structures, and prevention are the main challenges facing developing countries.

Studying corporate governance in emerging nations, like Nigeria, has been scarce. Nevertheless, this is starting to change as more and more corporate governance experts in developing nations are focusing on studying issues related to corporate governance in developing nations (Wanyama, Burton and Helliar, 2009; Chanda, Burton and Dunne, 2017).⁴ In order to determine what has been done, what is being done, what has been overlooked, and to suggest areas for future research on corporate governance in Nigeria, it was necessary to review and evaluate the existing literature on the subject of corporate governance in Nigeria. The assessment will be a useful resource for academics studying corporate governance in emerging nations in addition to for those in the financial and political spheres who either decide which developing nations to invest in or create the frameworks that direct corporate governance practices and policies in such nations.

II. Important concerns for nigerian corporate governance

Six major topics emerged as the preeminent challenges on corporate governance after a thorough analysis of the academic articles on the subject in Nigeria: corporate governance's institutional influence social responsibility of corporations, shareholder activism, corporate governance as well as business performance, and corporate governance disclosure. The main issues of corporate governance in Nigeria are enumerated along with a classification of the quantity of articles that fall under each category. These themes are grounded in the empirical problems that the papers address rather than theoretical frameworks. Since the majority of published papers were empirical in character, it was exceedingly challenging to categorise the works on theoretical framework. Several research studies have looked at the factors affecting corporate governance in the literature.

These studies looked at historical impacts from Britain's colonisation of Nigeria, requirements and regulations from financial institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and their effects on Nigeria.⁵ The study shows that there have been differing results from several of these international financial organisations' policies and regulations. The internal factors that keep on limit, impede, and obstruct the evolution of corporate governance procedures are more significant in the study of factors influencing corporate governance in Nigeria.

The literature keeps bringing up the same problems as barriers to better Nigerian corporate governance: a lacklustre financial system and governing framework, inadequate safeguards systemic corruption for investors who are minorities, a tendency for policy to backfire, and apathy on the part of shareholders. A number of corporate governance reforms been put into practice in response to these problems with the goal of promoting shareholder activism and increasing transparency in corporate governance disclosure. The literature on Nigerian corporate governance addresses the topic of corporate governance and activist shareholders disclosure in great detail. The majority of the literature on these issues has focused on finding solutions to address the issues of low disclosure and ineffective shareholder agitation. The last topic in the literature to receive a lot of attention is social responsibility of corporations. In Nigeria, social responsibility of corporations has arisen due to youth restlessness regarding the Niger Delta's militancy, not because businesses genuinely felt compelled to give back to the community where the area has been severely damaged by the oil exploration undertaken by international corporations, leading to sinkhole formation, erosion, biodiversity loss, and contamination of soil, surface, and groundwater. As a result, the local population's health and means of subsistence have been severely impacted.

III. Corporate governance's institutional effects in nigeria

Within the corporate governance literature, there is a contentious dispute concerning the relative importance of either country-level governance procedures or company governance in defining the standard of corporate governance mechanisms at the business level? According to the research that is currently available, adopting effective corporate governance practices is impacted by both strong- and country-level characteristics. A nation's culture, laws, regulations, customs, and institutions are typically included in the governing mechanisms on a national scale. The term "firm-level governance mechanisms" refers to the internal mechanisms of a company, among others, the shareholders and the board of directors, competitors, consumers, bankers, and employees.

Nevertheless, the results of the study's countries determined how much of a role either firm- or country-level governance had. In recent times, corporate governance has found to be more impacted by firm-level governance in industrialised nations than by country-level governance. In contrast, country-level governance has a tendency to have a much wider impact than firm-level governance in emerging nations.

Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) used the following country characteristics: the level of financial and economic development as well as the legal protection for minority investors. They found that firm variables, however only explained 4–22% of the variables related to governance, nation-specific factors explained 39–73% of options made by firms regarding their governance. This research focused examines how corporate governance is affected by national governance systems.

Furthermore, firm characteristics in the context of developing nations explain not one of the governing differences because, in these places, the price of implementing sound corporate governance procedures exceed any potential advantages. The research's conclusions show that corporate governance procedures are significantly influenced by both indoors and outside factors. On the external front, corporate governance practices in developing nations like Nigeria have been profoundly impacted by pressures from multinational organisations like The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Development Bank of the World Bank, and globalisation. These global financial institutions imposed harsh structural reforms that have significantly changed corporate governance standards in developing nations as requirements for renegotiating loans in the mid-1980s.

These actions were primarily designed to persuade developing nations to accept corporate governance model of Anglo-America. with special attention to the following actions: The governments of developing nations were under pressure to abandon interventionist industrial policies and drastically reduce state- owned involvement in the process of production (e.g., by encouraging the privatisation as well as the selling of state-owned businesses) as a result of fiscal austerity consisting of severe cutbacks. Additionally, these global financial institutions emphasised equity financing heavily and pushed emerging nations to liberalise financial markets and deregulate interest rates and exchange rates. Additionally, these international corporations employed techniques for cross-border oversight and monitoring to ensure adherence to standards of corporate governance and financial reporting recommended practices accounting, and standardisation, enforcement, compliance, and integration of national financial economies.

The unique institutional configurations within are arranged so that the persistence of systemic shortcomings impedes the achievement of noteworthy advancements in corporate governance methodologies. One of the many internal shortcomings is the severe lack of infrastructure, which drives up operating expenses since companies must operate their own power plants to provide the electricity they need to operate. Because of the unstable economic and social climate, as well as ineffective economic policies, prices for products and services are rising. the incapacity of succeeding administrations to stop corrupt activities in public and private entities because their anti-corruption initiatives are more focused on voicing condemnation than on finding a real solution. Adegbite, however, doesn't waste time in emphasising that corruption is a global problem with grave consequences that affect not just not only to developing nations but also to the global community. High-profile business scandals have occurred recently, including those involving Parmalat in Italy, Worldcom and Enron in America, and Polly Peck in the United Kingdom.

Even if corruption is still a problem, there are further problems that are just as significant, like the lax legal system that provides investor protection is minimal to non-existent. A hostile legal environment makes it difficult for investors to enter the market and guarantees that individuals who disregard the lax regulatory framework act independently risk. Traders and their money are therefore not secure. It is challenging to definitively identify which factor has a greater influence on something because of the complexity of the interconnections with relation to internal and external forces. In Nigerian corporate governance, internal and external factors continue to have a significant impact on one another. Internal factors also work to impede, taint, and suppress the adoption of sound corporate governance practices. External influences on corporate governance standards may be a positive development, but many of the codes are not rooted in Nigeria's corporate governance narrative. As such, they may be best viewed as Western solutions that are not always appropriate for addressing the country's corporate governance problems.

IV. Reforms in corporate governance

Reforms to corporate leadership aim to enhance the standard of corporate leadership by implementing institutional, market, national, and business levels changes. The principal components of these goals of reforms are to enhance efficiency of the market, performance, responsibility, supervision, and management, and the transfer from state-owned businesses to the private sector. It is important to note that these changes were brought about by external pressure applied to the Nigerian government, not because these were the original plans of the government. Three study strands are prevalent in the corporate governance literature changes in Nigeria.⁶ Those in the first group thought that the corporate governance reforms had a significant positive impact on the standard of concerning corporate governance in Nigeria, the second group of people hold the opinion that the reforms' effects could be classified as mixed, while the final group maintains that the reforms' failure to produce any notable results is due to systemic institutional deficiencies.

By implementing policies aimed at privatising, deregulate, and liberalising state-owned firms, the initial sets of improvements to corporate governance sought to reduce the role of the government in corporate governance matters. The goal in doing this was to gradually lessen the role that the government played in directing economic activity while letting market forces and procedures take centre stage. As a result, the Nigerian government liquidated its ownership interests in publicly traded businesses include banks, lodging facilities, insurance providers, phone providers, and cement producers. According to Oyejide and Soyibo's (2001) works, the government faced significant challenges when it came to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, particularly when it came to carrying out the privatisation exercises. These challenges included strong opposition from labour unions, managers, and employees as well as opposition from philosophy and ideology. Additionally, there was a lack of a regulatory and competitive framework to help guide the privatisation process. Consequently, the government decided to resume the privatisation process after it had been put on hold for three years. To achieve this, it cut links with businesses that it believed could be carried out more effectively and efficiently by the private sector.

The subsequent reform package prioritised strengthening financial markets and institutions. A two-pronged strategy was used for this. Creating a code of corporate governance that strengthened corporate governance practices was the first component of the reform. The PENCOM and NAICOM codes, the Nigerian banks' code of conduct, the corporate governance code of 2003, and the code of conduct for shareholder associations in Nigeria. According to Ahunwan(2002), Okike(2007), and Adegbite(2010) in their evaluation of Nigerian corporate governance laws, the country's laws have primarily been described as British laws taken from scratch. As a result, these policies have dreadfully failed to address and overcome the numerous issues with corporate practices exclusive to the institutional framework in Nigeria.

Moreover, Adegbite and Osemeke (2016) studied the variety of corporate governance codes that have been created to direct and control the actions of many stakeholders; these codes are intended to promote a culture and practice of sound corporate governance. They discover data that suggests the existence of disagreements between the different standards has major ramifications for Nigerian corporate governance procedures. More harm is done to corporate governance in Nigeria as a result of the spread of corporate governance guidelines, which lessen regulatory enforcement and decrease public listed companies' compliance. Therefore, even while the formulation of codes for corporate governance is a good thing, the fact that there are many codes does not improve the standard of Nigerian corporate governance if it weakens the process that it is intended to fortify.⁷

Fig 1: Corporate Responsibility in Nigerian Banking

The second reform component concentrated on enhancing the banks' and insurance companies' current financial capabilities. The Nigerian Central Bank explicitly demanded that banks and insurance businesses recapitalize; failure to comply by the deadlines would result in harsh fines for the affected entities. As a result, a number of banks that failed to meet the minimum capital requirements were compelled to amalgamate; as a result of the bank consolidation exercise, the entire quantity of banks decreased from 89 to 24. Additionally, as a result of the consolidation process, the capital bases of the current banks were strengthened and their capitalization greatly increased between $15 million and 192 million USD following the exercise. A few years later, the banking reforms were a huge success, but several bank crisis occurred when banks in the Nigerian financial sector failed that led to the rescue of failing banks through a bailout and financial intervention. This incident seemed to have tainted the accomplishment of the banking sector's recapitalization.

V. Activism among shareholders

One way that investors and shareholders might influence management decisions of companies in which they have a stake is through shareholder activism (Gillian and Stark, 1998; Romano, 2000). This is particularly true, when the businesses are underperforming in terms of profits and investment returns (Karpoff, 2001; Hendrix et al., 2005). In such cases, the shareholders utilise shareholder activism as a tactic to remove the board's current directors and install a new group of qualified directors (Nelson, 2006; Gillian and Starks, 2007).

A variety of tactics are used by investors in shareholder activism, including meeting and negotiating with the board about relevant concerns, writing a letter to the board expressing dissatisfaction, threatening to divest, and shareholder resolutions and the application of media pressure to sway business decisions (Black, 1998; Bainbridge, 2005).⁸ According to Gillian and Stark (2007), the major goal of shareholder activism is to resolve the agency conflict that results from shareholders giving managers control over the company's operations. For the simple reason that managers' and shareholders' interests collide, agency conflicts are likely to arise. Managers are more concerned with increasing their salary and bonuses than shareholders, who want to maximise shareholder value. When managers are allowed to follow their own interests, they frequently end up underperforming in terms of increasing shareholder wealth.

The study provided insight into a number of crucial concerns impacting Nigerian shareholders' rights, including the organisation and conduct of general meetings, the notice given to shareholders of planned meetings, the availability of information to shareholders, and insider trading concerns. Nigerian investors exhibit apathy due to self-interest; they prioritise safeguarding their commercial interests over investing the time and energy necessary to rectify companies in which they have a stake that are operating incorrectly (Uche et al., 2016).

In Nigeria, investors' preferred course of action is to divest and liquidate rather than concentrate on when shareholders use this tactic to pressure underperforming companies to perform better, shareholder activism and corporate governance suffer as a result (Uche et al., 2015). By selling off and liquidating their assets, shareholders typically gain short-term advantages; yet, over time, their shortsightedness hurts corporate governance and shareholder activism.As one step that might be taken to boost shareholder power, Amao and Amaeshi (2008) recommend that more people attend annual general meetings in order to address this specific issue. They advise using information communication technology (ICT) to do this, including the internet and the international mobile communication system (GSM) as instruments to boost stockholder engagement. While these can be considered an excellent place to start and evidence exists to imply that publicly traded firms' disclosure to shareholders has improved, with information for shareholders accessible on their websites and in annual report copies. However, Nigerian shareholder activism has not increased as a result of these advancements. It does seem that the problem of shareholder apathy cannot be easily fixed by improved information disclosure, for obvious reasons. While this could be beneficial, it is evident that shareholder passivity in Nigeria is a complicated issue that would require a number of additional steps, including bolstering lax regulations, judicial reforms, and tackling corruption (Amao and Amaeshi, 2008; Adegbite and Nakajima, 2012).

Despite the most recent legislation, shareholder apathy remains a concern. Although there have been some slight changes to corporate governance regulations requiring shareholders to be more involved in the operations of their companies, shareholders have not yet taken advantage of the opportunity to actively participate in shareholder activism. The key task at hand is still figuring out how to foster an environment and culture that will allow for more shareholder participation in corporate governance. While America and Europe have made greater strides in corporate governance and shareholder activism, there are still valuable lessons to be learned from them about raising shareholder participation. Strong institutions that improve corporate governance practices are found in America and Europe. Of special significance, these institutions are bolstering those that can improve the corporate governance standards, such as increasing adherence to current laws, penalising corrupt behaviour, and implementing judicial changes.

VI. Disclosure on corporate governance

An increasing number of calls for higher corporate governance disclosure levels are coming from developing nations. Given the recent flurry of financial scandals corporate governance transparency is more crucial than ever because of the global economy and the seeming failure of once-thriving international corporations. An essential component of market-based corporate conduct monitoring is a robust disclosure ethos, which is necessary to allow shareholders to effectively use their voting rights. More significantly, transparency can be seen as a valuable tool for shaping business practices and safeguarding investors and shareholders alike.⁹

To put it simply, disclosure of corporate governance is the deliberate sharing of information with the public by the administration staff employed by publicly traded corporations. Communicating and sharing information with external investors regarding the firm's performance and management is the aim of the disclosure. Other important stakeholders that are especially worried about the environmental and social agendas are also calling for this information, in addition to investors and shareholders who need it to evaluate the performance of their investments. As of right now, the majority of studies on disclosure in corporate governance in developing nations agree that it is deficient. Nonetheless, businesses in poor nations typically have a higher percentage of required disclosure compared to voluntary disclosure. Regulations requiring businesses to reveal particular data about their financial performance provide a plausible explanation for this. However, in the event of voluntary disclosure, the firms' discretion governs the disclosure rather than a required duty.

There is a dearth of corporate governance studies transparency in Nigeria, with few articles appearing in respectable publications. Enhancing the calibre transparency of corporate governance has emerged as the main goal of research on the topic in Nigeria. There have been three studies looking at voluntary disclosure; Okike (1998) looked at audit reporting for publicly traded companies in Nigeria over a ten-year period and discovered that audit reporting in Nigeria has been heavily influenced by outside factors. Her work primarily contributes to the identification of outside factors. She categorised these factors combine to form three main categories: the multinational nature of the reporting firms, influences resulting from the adoption of global standards for financial accounting, and the Nigerian auditors' connection to the "big 4" global bookkeeping organisations. There seems to be a discrepancy in the findings of the other two studies that look at how voluntary disclosure affects corporate governance characteristics. Adelopo (2011) looks into the connection between corporate governance characteristics and the voluntary disclosure index. According to his analysis's findings, the amount of voluntary disclosure made by publicly traded corporations is significantly and favourably correlated with the board's size.

In contrast, there's a benefit but negligible link between every other aspect of corporate governance, such as the makeup of the board, the amount of leverage, the size of the company, profitability, and the kind of auditor. Adebimpe and Okougbo's (2011) findings are not the same as Adelepo's (2011). Adebimpe and Okougbo discover a noteworthy positive correlation block and management ownership as well as the degree of voluntary disclosure, however, there is a negative correlation between the voluntary disclosure and business performance and firm size. Comparative analyses of disclosure policies in other African nations have not been a common feature of research on disclosure. Studies on disclosure in corporate governance have previously been restricted to examining Nigerian publicly traded corporations' disclosure. In this field, two research articles investigations have been published, these research has looked at the revelation policies of banks in Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria. When Isukul and Chizea (2017a) look at the corporate governance disclosure of South African and Nigerian publicly traded banks, they find that both countries have high levels of required disclosure for their businesses. On the other hand, banking in Nigeria and South Africa reported minimal amounts of voluntarily disclosed information. Furthermore, there seems to be a notable disparity in the voluntary governance disclosure that Nigerian banks report; it seems as though these reports are done merely ceremoniously and have little bearing on the banks' overarching business plans. Because They adhere to global standards for voluntary disclosure, yet they also but also have a link to them, banks in South Africa take a more deliberate approach to this.

Isukul and Chizea (2017) found that Nigerian banks had a greater level of corporate governance disclosure than their Ghanaian counterparts in the second research comparing disclosure practices between Nigerian and Ghanaian banks. However, when it comes to voluntary governance disclosure, banks in Ghana and Nigeria also receive low marks. The inclusion regarding disclosures about the concept of corporate social responsibility crucial component in the literature on disclosure of corporate governance is a significant finding of the research on disclosure of corporate governance in banks in Ghana, South Africa, and Nigeria. This is important because it starts to highlight a trend within the corporate governance literature transparency in developing nations.

Beyond just reporting a company's financial performance, disclosure of corporate governance

also includes of social responsibility for corporations’ programmes, in which companies notify important stakeholders about the social and environmental improvements they do to raise the standard of living in the places where they conduct business. The adoption of CSR activities by banks may not be indicative of what is happening in other businesses, hence the research conclusions should not be applied universally. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that this new tendency is present not just in the banking sector in Nigeria but also in South Africa and Ghana. Both studies used tiny sample numbers that are not conducive to robust analysis, thus there is still more work to be done in this area.

VII. Nigerian corporate social responsibility

The fundamental tenet of corporate social responsibility is that companies have a duty that goes beyond the walls of their organisations (Hills and Jones, 1992; Jamali, 2007). Apart from carrying out their business operations, companies must attend to the requirements of other important players in the business environment. In actuality, mature market-oriented economies that have effectively established robust institutional and regulatory frameworks capable of effectively and fairly executing the law are the origins of corporate social responsibility (Lantos, 2001; Amaeshi, 2010).¹⁰ Nevertheless, in developing nations plagued by a deficient institutional and regulatory framework, a lack of the rule of law, the incapacity of the government to safeguard the lives and corporate social responsibility has a completely different meaning and interpretation when it comes to the property of its inhabitants, bureaucratic roadblocks, and wanton levels of corruption (Eweje, 2007; Dobers and Halme, 2009). As a result, this research paper will define corporate social responsibility using a definition that is applicable to developing nations. According to Visser et al. (2007) and Matten and Moon (2008),¹¹ corporate social responsibility (CSR) in developing countries refers to "the formal and informal ways in which business makes a contribution to improving the governance, social, ethical, labour, and environmental conditions of the developing countries in which they operate, while remaining sensitive to prevailing religious, historical, and cultural contexts."

In poor nations, corporations typically respond to the shortcomings of governments through social responsibility of corporations; this is true with Nigeria is not an exception. Three main themes can be found in Nigerian research on corporate social responsibility: social responsibility of corporations by foreign corporations, of social responsibility for corporations by domestic companies, and the government's function in guaranteeing the enactment of appropriate legislation and rules pertaining to corporate social responsibility movement in Nigeria.

Multinational corporations in Nigeria began to take part in CSR as a result of the war and crises in the Niger Delta, where mining activities had wreaked havoc and contaminated farmlands and waterways. Because their primary source of income has been ruined and poisoned, it has consequently become impossible for the residents of the Niger Delta area to make a living wage. There are two main lines of inquiry into the connection Between Nigeria between global firms and corporate social responsibility. The first contends that the provision of social and communal services by these corporations, such as the construction of schools, markets, and road infrastructure, has greatly increased the welfare of the populace in the area. To some extent, they contend that the primary reason multinational corporations are supplying basic infrastructure is because the government has been careless and has failed to offer these necessities.

There is a philosophical school that contends, however, that the converse is accurate, that the Niger Delta region's residents are worse off as a result of oil, and that the profits and advantages multinational corporations reap from extracting crude oil greatly surpasses any CSR contributions they contribute to the neighbourhood communities. They contend that the host towns have descended into poverty and have not much improved. Apart from the pollution caused by the oil, they actually contend that their situation is worse.

There is the bloody conflict that the area has learned to expect. As a result, there have been needless deaths, property losses, and village destruction due to violent interactions between small communities and large enterprises in the community. Consequently, the Niger Delta Region's host communities and oil firms have not experienced less violent confrontations because of business social responsibility initiatives. The growing involvement of indigenous businesses in corporate social responsibility is one particularly fascinating story in the literature on CSR. In contrast to multinational oil firms, whose involvement in CSR aims to lessen tension and disagreement between the oil companies and the host communities, participation of indigenous peoples in CSR is different. Indigenous people are more charitable when it comes to corporate social responsibility.

VIII. Conclusion

There isn't much discussion of inadequacies in risk management, internal controls, and corporate governance institutional investors' roles regarding corporate governance, or the function of boards in corporate governance in the articles on the topic. According to Ehikioya (2007)¹² and Uche et al. (2016), have covered the topic of the board's role in corporate governance and institutional investor activism to some extent, but more work has to be done in this area to better comprehend the challenges and obtain a deeper understanding of them. A further avenue for corporate governance research is to assess the result of executive compensation regarding business performance in Nigeria to determine if compensation improves or worsens publicly traded companies' performance. Additionally, while there is ample evidence from corporate governance research that institutional factors have a significant impact on corporate governance, research must look at the ways that informal establishments, religious beliefs, and value systems influence and shape corporate governance procedures in Nigeria. It's possible that there are more subtle structural problems underlying Nigeria's corporate leadership problem than just institutional shortcomings; these need to be investigated.

Lastly, a critique among the writings on corporate governance is that scholars in the field must choose particular areas of interest and conduct in-depth study in order to advance that domain of corporate governance research. Adegbite (2012)¹³ and Idemudia (2011),¹⁴ for instance, have both conducted substantial research on institutional deficiencies in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility, respectively. These are but a handful instances of the unique instance; generally speaking, academics in the field of corporate leadership study don't concentrate on a narrow area of interest, but rather explore it by regularly writing and publishing in it with the goal of furthering the field's body of knowledge.

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Footnotes

1. Author is a Student at Amity University, Chattisgarh, India.

2. Adebimbe, U. and Okougbo, P. (2011) "Corporate governance, company attribute and voluntary disclosure." International Journal of Research in Computer Application ↩

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4. Aliyu, S., Jamil, M. and Mohamed, R. (2014)"The mediating role of management control system in the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of bailed-out banks in Nigeria." ↩

5. Amaeshi (2010) “International financial institutions and discursive institutional change: Implications for CSR in a developing country. Journal of Change Management ↩

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12. Ehikioya, B.I. (2009) “Corporate governance performance structure and firm performance in developing economies evidence from Nigeria”. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 9(3):231-243. ↩

13. Adegbite, E. (2012) "Corporate governance regulation in Nigeria," Corporate Governance, Vol. 12 Is. 2, pp.257 - 276 ↩

14. Ehikioya, B.I. (2009) “Corporate governance performance structure and firm performance in developing economies evidence from Nigeria”. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 9(3):231-243. ↩