Introduction
The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“the Atrocities Act” or “the Act”) is one of the most important, and most contested, statutes in India. It was enacted to give effect to the constitutional abolition of untouchability and to the State’s duty to protect the weaker sections from social injustice and exploitation.1 Its distinctive features, such as Special Courts, enhanced punishment, the bar on anticipatory bail and statutory presumptions, indicate that the legislature regarded the existing criminal law as inadequate to prevent members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes from being subjected to violence and humiliation because of their marginalisation.2
The same features also expose the Act to a countervailing concern: that a law designed to protect people from caste atrocities could be used in a land dispute, a money dispute, an employment dispute or a quarrel between neighbours in which the castes of the parties are only incidental. Courts have been asked, time and again, at what point a general offence, such as simple abuse, criminal intimidation or a scuffle, turns into a statutory atrocity. The answer that has emerged for the insult and abuse offences in sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) is that those provisions are attracted only when the insult or abuse is linked to the caste or tribal group of the victim. In Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court observed that the offence is not established merely because the informant is a member of a Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to that caste.3
This paper explores that doctrine of “intent to humiliate.” Part II outlines the statutory background and the changes made in 2015 and 2018 that bear on the issue. Part III traces the development of the doctrine through the courts. Part IV examines the two filters used by courts, namely “public view” and “abuse by caste name”. Part V discusses the key doctrinal issue of proof of mens rea and the burden of proof. Part VI explores whether the amendments are consistent with the judicial gloss. Part VII critically appraises the doctrine and proposes an analytical test, and Part VIII concludes.
Statutory framework and the amendments
A. The original scheme: section 3(1)(x) and section 3(2)(v)
As enacted in 1989, section 3(1)(x) of the Act punished a person, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, who “intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view”.4 Three ingredients were thus built into the offence: (i) the accused is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; (ii) the accused insults or intimidates a member of such a community with the intention of humiliating him; and (iii) the offence occurs in a place within public view. Section 3(2)(v) enhanced the punishment for offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for ten years or more, when committed against a person or property “on the ground that” the person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or the property belongs to such a member.5
Both clauses contain mental elements. Section 3(1)(x) called for a specific intent to humiliate, and section 3(2)(v) called for a causal connection between the offence and the victim’s caste or tribal identity. Courts read both as requiring more than the victim’s membership of a protected group.
B. The 2015 Amendment
The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, which took effect on 26 January 2016, significantly rewrote section 3.6 For present purposes, four changes matter.
First, section 3(1)(x) gave way to two clauses. Section 3(1)(r), which carries over its words, punishes a person who “intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view”, and the new section 3(1)(s) punishes a person who “abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view”. Abuse by caste name thus became a distinct offence under section 3(1)(s), while the specific intent requirement was preserved in section 3(1)(r).7
Second, the mental element in section 3(2) changed. Section 3(2)(v) no longer requires the offence to be committed “on the ground that” the victim is a member of a protected group; it now reads “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member”. A new clause, section 3(2)(va), uses the same words for the offences specified in the Schedule to the Act. Parliament thus moved the mental element in section 3(2) from motive to knowledge.8
Third, clause (c) was added to section 8. Where it is proved that “the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family”, “the Court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is proved”.9 This is a rebuttable presumption of awareness of caste or tribal identity only. It presumes neither ill will nor motive.
Fourth, new categories of atrocity were introduced and the rights of victims and witnesses were strengthened. These additions are beyond the scope of this paper but point to a legislative thrust towards broader protection.10
C. The 2018 Amendment and section 18A
In Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court, concerned at misuse of the Act, directed that a preliminary inquiry may be conducted before an FIR is registered, that a public servant could be arrested only with the written permission of the appointing authority and any other person only with the approval of the Senior Superintendent of Police, and that there was no absolute bar on anticipatory bail where no prima facie case was made out.11 In response, Parliament enacted the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018, which added section 18A to the Act. It provides that no preliminary enquiry is required for registering an FIR, that no approval is required for arrest, and that section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not apply, notwithstanding any judgment, order or direction of any court.12 The Court then recalled the Mahajan directions on arrest and preliminary inquiry on review and, in Prathvi Raj Chauhan, upheld section 18A, while observing that in exceptional cases, where no prima facie offence is disclosed, the FIR can be quashed.13
Section 18A matters for this paper because it removes the procedural filters at the threshold. The ingredients in section 3, which are substantive filters, therefore carry greater weight. With the doors of preliminary inquiry and anticipatory bail narrowed, the substantive requirement of “intent to humiliate” remains the key factor distinguishing general abuse from a statutory atrocity under section 3(1)(r).
One further structural point arises. Since 1 July 2024 the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure have been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.14 Most of the cases considered below arose under the earlier codes, and legislative alignment may be necessary where the Act’s Schedule and section 18A cross-refer to them. That does not affect the analysis of the Act’s mental elements.
The evolution of the intent requirement
A. Early decisions: nexus and context
Early decisions under the 1989 Act required the accused’s conduct to be connected to the victim’s caste. In Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that the sine qua non of section 3(2)(v) is that the offence be committed against the victim on the basis that he belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, and it set aside the conviction under that clause because there was no evidence of this.15 Later decisions on section 3(2)(v) likewise emphasised the words “on the ground that” and required the prosecution to prove that the offence was committed because of the victim’s caste.16
In Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., a case arising from a land dispute, the Court quashed the proceedings because the complaint alleged only that the accused had abused the complainant by the name of his caste, and did not allege the basic ingredients of section 3(1)(x): that the accused was not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and that he intentionally insulted or intimidated the complainant with intent to humiliate in a place within public view.17 It is an early case in which the Court tested the allegations against the ingredients of the offence at the threshold.
B. Swaran Singh and place within public view
The phrase “any place within public view” was considered in Swaran Singh v. State. The Court distinguished a “public place” from a “place within public view”. A lawn outside a house that can be seen from the road or lane beyond the boundary wall is a place within public view even though it is private, and a remark made inside a building is within public view only if members of the public, not merely relatives or friends, are present.18 The decision turned on location, not purpose, but it did establish the practice of reading the Act’s requirements as ingredients of a penal provision, each of which must be found.
C. Hitesh Verma: the doctrine crystallised
The doctrine was stated in its modern form in Hitesh Verma.19 The Court identified the basic ingredients of section 3(1)(r) as (1) intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view. It held that an insult or intimidation is not an offence under the Act unless it is on account of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and that the offence is not established merely because the informant is a member of a Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate for the reason that the victim belongs to that caste. The case arose from a land dispute, the words were alleged to have been uttered within the four walls of a building with no member of the public present, and the Court quashed the charge-sheet to the extent of the charge under section 3(1)(r).
The decision is important for two reasons. Doctrinally, it links “intent to humiliate” to caste, so that the intent required is not merely an intent to insult but an intent to humiliate a member of the protected group for that reason. Procedurally, it establishes that courts will examine the allegations at the threshold to determine whether that ingredient is present, even after the 2018 Amendment. Its reasoning rests on the Court’s reading of the object of the Act: to punish those who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment on members of the protected groups, while not every insult is of that nature.20
D. Shajan Skaria: mere knowledge is not enough
In Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, the Kerala High Court had refused anticipatory bail to an accused who had published a video on the internet that was highly critical of a legislator belonging to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed that he be released on bail in the event of arrest.21 It held that not every intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a protected community results in caste-based humiliation, and that knowledge that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste is not enough to attract section 3(1)(r): the insult must be for the reason that the complainant belongs to that community. The Court also held that, although section 18 bars anticipatory bail, the bar does not apply where the ingredients of the offence are not disclosed on a prima facie reading of the complaint, and that the court must itself determine whether a prima facie case is disclosed.22
Shajan Skaria is significant for separating knowledge from intent. That the victim belongs to a certain caste, and that the accused knows it, is one fact. That the accused intended to humiliate the victim on the ground of caste is another. Proof of the first does not prove the second.
E. Recent consolidation: Karuppudayar and Keshaw Mahto
In Karuppudayar v. State, the Court quashed proceedings against an accused alleged to have abused a public servant by caste name in the complainant’s office chamber, where no one else was present at the time; his colleagues arrived only afterwards. The Court found that the incident did not occur at a place within public view, so neither section 3(1)(r) nor section 3(1)(s) was attracted.23 The decision establishes that a caste-based allegation fails in the absence of a statutory ingredient, in this case public view.
In January 2026, in Keshaw Mahto v. State of Bihar, the Court reiterated the point and emphasised the content of the abuse. It noted that, for section 3(1)(s), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe would not be enough, and that merely saying a caste name would not constitute the offence; the allegations must reveal that the abuses were laced with the caste name or that the caste name was hurled as an abuse, and the element of humiliation is to be gathered from the intentional insult towards the caste.24 The same order quashed the prosecution of the appellant, to whom no overt act was attributed, holding that his mere presence did not establish participation.
Together, these judgments seem to reflect a consensus on the following propositions: (i) the complainant’s membership of a protected group is necessary but not sufficient; (ii) the accused’s awareness of that membership is also insufficient; (iii) there must be an intent to humiliate on account of caste in the case of section 3(1)(r), or abuse by caste name in the case of section 3(1)(s); and (iv) public view must be established as a statutory ingredient.
Two statutory filters: public view and caste name
A. Public view
The public view requirement is a locational filter, independent of intent. Swaran Singh and Hitesh Verma make clear that a place that cannot be seen by the public is not within public view, and that the presence of relatives or friends of the complainant is not enough.25 Karuppudayar applies the same test to an incident within the four corners of an office chamber.
The Delhi High Court has held that the persons present should be independent and impartial and should not have any business or other close association with the complainant.26 This gloss does not appear in the text of the statute, but it is in line with the reading that the Act is concerned with public disgrace. So far the Supreme Court is not known to have applied a consistent “independent witness” rule, which leaves an element of uncertainty.
The bearing of this filter on the “intent to humiliate” doctrine is limited. The locational element defeats a claim under section 3(1)(r) or (s) arising from a scuffle or abuse in a private setting before the court reaches intent. In a public setting, on the other hand, the court must ask whether the insult was caste-related. So a dispute between neighbours over parking in which the caste name is never mentioned passes the first filter and fails at the second.
B. Abuse “by caste name”
Section 3(1)(s) supplies a further filter. It does not in terms require “intent to humiliate”, but it does require abuse “by caste name”. The latest decisions nonetheless find an element of humiliation in it: the caste name has to be invoked as an insult, and the humiliation has to come from that insult.27 This prevents absurd results, such as treating a neutral reference to a person’s caste in conversation as an offence, but it also places on the prosecution the burden of establishing context.
A caste name used as an insult, as an expression of disrespect or to evoke the historical disrespect attached to the caste will generally meet the test. A word of abuse with no caste content will generally not. The distinction is a factual one, and courts examine closely the words alleged, the context and whether the complaint identifies the words as caste-based.
Mens rea and the burden of proof
A. Three distinct mental elements
The Act’s mental elements are not always distinguished in the case law. The first is knowledge: awareness that the victim is from a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. This is found in section 3(2)(v) and (va) and is assisted by the presumption in section 8(c). The second is the intent to humiliate, expressly required by section 3(1)(r). The third is caste-based motive, which was explicit in the old section 3(2)(v) (“on the ground that”) and which Hitesh Verma and Shajan Skaria treat as a dimension of section 3(1)(r) (“intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste”).
These elements are presented in ascending order of difficulty of proof. Knowledge can sometimes be inferred, as among neighbours or colleagues. Humiliation is to be inferred from words and actions. Caste-based motive requires the court to find the reason for the conduct. The doctrine of intent to humiliate operates so that under section 3(1)(r) the prosecution must prove the third element, while under section 3(2)(v) and (va) the first is sufficient.
B. The general rule: burden on the prosecution
The Atrocities Act does not alter the general principle of criminal law that the prosecution must establish each element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.28 The only statutory presumptions the Act introduces are in section 8: abetment, where the accused rendered financial assistance to a person accused of an offence under the Chapter (clause (a)); common intention or common object, where a group commits an offence as a sequel to an existing dispute regarding land or any other matter (clause (b)); and awareness of caste or tribal identity (clause (c)). None of them presumes an intent to humiliate or a caste-based motive.29
The “intent to humiliate” doctrine therefore applies the ordinary burden; it is not an exception to it. Where Hitesh Verma quashes a charge and Shajan Skaria grants protection from arrest, they do so on the basis that the material on record does not prima facie disclose the required intent. The accused does not have to prove the absence of intent; rather, the prosecution’s material, taken at its highest, does not contain it.
C. How proof is balanced at different stages
Courts tailor the standard to the stage of the proceedings. At the stage of an FIR or a quashing petition, the question is whether the allegations, if accepted as true, prima facie establish the ingredients; the evidence is not weighed. In Prathvi Raj Chauhan the Court considered that, in “exceptional cases”, the inherent power to quash survives section 18A, on the settled principles for quashing.30 On an application for anticipatory bail, Shajan Skaria allows the court, at least where the material on which the complaint rests is itself in the public domain, to read the complaint and that material to determine whether a prima facie case is made out, notwithstanding the bar in sections 18 and 18A.31 At trial, the prosecution must prove the ingredients on evidence.
Two aspects of this balance deserve mention. First, the prima facie examination is not a mini-trial, but neither is it a formality: it asks whether the complaint, on its face, alleges caste-linked words or conduct. A complaint of abuse, assault or a property dispute that contains no caste-related element will not stand under section 3(1)(r) or (s). Second, intent may be inferred from context: the words used, the nature of the relationship, any previous history of caste hostility, any power imbalance, and whether the conflict had a non-caste origin. But where the dispute is clearly about land, money or personal enmity, it is more difficult to draw the inference of caste-based intent, as in Hitesh Verma and Gorige Pentaiah.
D. The role of section 8(c)
Section 8(c) has an important but limited role. Where the accused is shown to have personal knowledge of the victim or the victim’s family, it presumes that he was aware of the victim’s caste, thereby removing one contested question from many prosecutions under section 3(2)(v) and (va), whose mental element is knowledge. It does not carry a prosecution under section 3(1)(r), because the Court requires an intent based on caste, which, as Shajan Skaria holds, knowledge does not establish. Section 8(c) thus reinforces prosecutions for the Penal Code offences reached by section 3(2), while the intent doctrine operates on the insult and intimidation offences in section 3(1). The two are not mutually exclusive; they deal with different offences.
The amendments and the judicial gloss: reconciling text and doctrine
An argument against the doctrine may be made from the text. Section 3(1)(r) speaks of “intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe”. Read literally, this means an intent to humiliate a person who is a member of the protected group, not an intent to humiliate him because he is a member. Parliament knew how to state a causal link, as with “on the ground that”, and in 2015 it replaced those words with “knowing” in section 3(2)(v) and used “knowing” in the new section 3(2)(va). A reading that insists on a caste-based motive in section 3(1)(r) may seem to conflict with the direction of the 2015 reforms, which expanded liability and relaxed proof.
There are three answers, however. First, the object of the Act supports the Court’s interpretation. The Act defines an “atrocity” simply as an offence punishable under section 3, so the definition does not decide the point, but the Act was enacted to punish offences targeted at persons for the reason of their caste status,32 and in that setting the words “intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste” naturally mean that the person is humiliated in his capacity as a member of a Scheduled Caste. Second, the 2015 Amendment was specifically targeted. It changed the mental element in section 3(2), where the underlying Penal Code offence is the gravamen, and left section 3(1)(r) in the same terms as the former section 3(1)(x). Where Parliament re-enacts language that courts have interpreted, it is reasonable to accept that construction. Third, section 3(1)(s) meets the text-based concern about abuse: Parliament created a specific offence of abuse by caste name in a place within public view, so section 3(1)(r) is left for insult and intimidation that are caste-connected in some other manner.
It is better to say that the doctrine and the amendments operate at different levels. If a scuffle results in a Schedule offence against a person known to be a member of a protected group, knowledge is sufficient and is supported by section 8(c): this is an atrocity without proof of caste-based motive. The Schedule is not confined to grave offences. It includes voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful restraint and criminal intimidation,33 so even a scuffle causing a simple injury may fall within section 3(2)(va) if the accused knew the victim’s status. Insult, intimidation and abuse under section 3(1)(r) and (s) require, in addition, the caste intent or the caste-name element. An altercation involving only ordinary abuse, with no Schedule offence and no caste element, falls in neither category and is left to the general penal law.
A second problem is posed by section 18A. Parliament has removed the procedural safeguards at the threshold and the Court has upheld that choice, yet the threshold examination of ingredients in Shajan Skaria and Prathvi Raj Chauhan has restored a safeguard through judicial review. This is permissible because it is a review of whether an offence is disclosed, not a preliminary inquiry into the truth of the charges. It needs care, however, for if the threshold review becomes too demanding it will revive the Mahajan directions by another name.
Critical appraisal and a proposed analytical framework
A. Strengths of the doctrine
The intent to humiliate doctrine has three merits. It preserves the integrity of the statute by confining it to its purpose, thereby keeping the statute and its special procedural protections legitimate. It protects accused persons from the harsh effects of the Act, which bars anticipatory bail, where the allegations disclose nothing more than a common dispute. It also provides a conceptual test for the lower courts.
B. Risks
The doctrine also carries risks. Humiliation by caste is more often than not subtle and cumulative, conveyed by tone, by conduct and by social context, and not always through the explicit use of a slur. Testing for specific words describing caste may fail to protect victims of subtle but real caste-based indignity. Moreover, the victim is frequently socially and economically dependent on the accused, which makes it harder to find independent witnesses to substantiate the complaint and gives the “independent public” gloss still greater force. Official conviction statistics under the Act have historically been low, and though the reasons are disputed, courts need to be vigilant that the doctrine does not become an exacerbating factor.34
C. A proposed structured test
When applying section 3(1)(r) or (s), courts may adopt a four-step inquiry to balance protection and precision. First, status and knowledge: was the complainant a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and did the accused know it, with the presumption in section 8(c) applying where the accused had personal knowledge of the complainant or his family? Second, setting: did the incident occur in a place within public view, as developed in Swaran Singh? Third, content: do the words or actions invoke the complainant’s caste through the explicit mention of a caste name, through caste-coded epithets, or through conduct that draws on caste hierarchy? Fourth, nexus: given the context, including the cause of the conflict, the relationship between the parties and any past hostility based on caste or other grounds, can it reasonably be inferred that the humiliation was directed at the complainant as a member of the protected class?
This test keeps the three mental elements analytically distinct and makes clear that section 3(1)(r) is not satisfied by mere knowledge. It also calls on courts to examine the evidentiary basis for inferring nexus and not to treat the absence of an explicit slur as proof that there was no nexus. The same questions may be asked of the complaint and the material attached to it at the stage of quashing and bail.
D. Legislative reform
Parliament could help by stating that section 3(1)(r) requires a motive based on caste and not mere knowledge of caste; by defining “public view” so as to settle the question of independence; and by bringing the Schedule and section 18A into line with the new criminal codes. A clear statutory statement would relieve the courts of having to determine legislative intent from the scant words of a provision first drafted in 1989.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s intent to humiliate doctrine has evolved over the past twenty years and now forms part of the law governing sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act. As Hitesh Verma, Shajan Skaria, Karuppudayar and the more recent orders of the Court show, abuse, intimidation or a scuffle does not amount to an offence under those provisions merely because the victim is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or the accused is aware of it. The prosecution has to prove an intention to humiliate on account of caste, or abuse by caste name, in a place within public view.
As to the burden of proof, the doctrine holds to the usual rule that the prosecution must establish each ingredient. The presumption in section 8(c) helps on knowledge of caste, but not on intent or motive. The 2015 and 2018 Amendments strengthened the protective machinery of the Act and widened liability under section 3(2)(v) and (va), but they did not change the mental element of section 3(1)(r), so the doctrine remains consistent with them if the three mental elements of knowledge, intent and motive are kept distinct.
The task for courts is to apply the doctrine without hollowing out the Act. An over-rigid insistence on slurs, or on independent public witnesses, would fail the very communities the Act was designed to serve. A consistent, contextual approach to inferring intent at each stage can preserve both the purpose of the Act and a fair criminal process.
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Footnotes
1. India Const. arts. 17, 46; see also The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India) (long title).
2. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), §§ 14, 18 (Special Courts and the bar on anticipatory bail respectively).
3. Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 (India), ¶ 18.
4. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), § 3(1)(x) (as enacted).
5. Id. § 3(2)(v) (as enacted).
6. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).
7. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), § 3(1)(r)–(s) (as amended 2016).
8. Id. § 3(2)(v), (va).
9. Id. § 8(c).
10. Id. § 15A (as inserted 2016).
11. Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 (India).
12. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 2018 (India); The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), § 18A.
13. Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 (India); Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727 (India).
14. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India); The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
15. Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 557 (India).
16. See, e.g., Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan, (2006) 3 SCC 771 (India); Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170 (India).
17. Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 12 SCC 531 (India).
18. Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 (India), ¶ 28.
19. Hitesh Verma, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12–13, 15–16, 18, 24.
20. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13; see also Prathvi Raj Chauhan, supra note 13 (setting out the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act).
21. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 INSC 625 (India Aug. 23, 2024) (Crim. App. No. 2622 of 2024), ¶¶ 88–89.
22. Id. ¶¶ 47–51, 60–61, 79–80.
23. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 INSC 132 (India Jan. 31, 2025), ¶¶ 11, 14–15, 18.
24. Keshaw Mahto v. State of Bihar, Special Leave Pet. (Crl.) No. 12144 of 2025 (India Jan. 12, 2026) (order), ¶¶ 15–17, 20. See also Santosha Devi v. UT of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 132 (India) (applying it), reported at Mere Abuse or Uttering Caste Name Not Offence Under SC/ST Act: J&K&L High Court, LiveLaw (Apr. 3, 2026), https://www.livelaw.in/amp/high-court/jammu-kashmir/jammu-and-kashmir-high-court-merely-abusing-scst-member-or-uttering-caste-name-not-enough-abuse-must-be-by-caste-name-in-public-view-to-constitute-offence-under-atrocities-act-528874.
25. See Swaran Singh, supra note 18, ¶ 28; Hitesh Verma, supra note 3, ¶¶ 14–15.
26. See, e.g., Virender Verma v. Neeraj Bajpai, Crl. L.P. 113/2016 (Del. HC Sept. 12, 2018) (India), ¶ 10 (following Daya Bhatnagar v. State, (2004) 109 DLT 915 (India)); see also Virender Singh Bidhuri v. State (NCT of Delhi), Bail Appln. 3485/2025 (Del. HC Oct. 28, 2025) (India), ¶¶ 8, 29–31 (recording the submission founded on these decisions; anticipatory bail refused under § 18; a flyover held to be within public view).
27. See Keshaw Mahto, supra note 24, ¶¶ 16–17.
28. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1 of 1872 (India), § 101, replaced by The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India), § 104.
29. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), § 8.
30. Prathvi Raj Chauhan, supra note 13; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (India).
31. Shajan Skaria, supra note 21, ¶¶ 47–52.
32. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), § 2(1)(a); Shajan Skaria, supra note 21, ¶ 60.
33. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India), sched. (entries for Indian Penal Code §§ 323, 341, 506); see Shajan Skaria, supra note 21, ¶ 79.
34. See Nat’l Crime Recs. Bureau, Crime in India (annual reports) (India); Himanshi Dahiya, High Crime Rate, Low Convictions: A Snapshot of SC, ST Atrocities in 5 Years, The Quint (Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.thequint.com/news/crime/crimes-against-sc-st-ncrb-data-five-years-atrocities (reporting, from NCRB data, conviction rates in crimes against Scheduled Castes of 42.4 per cent in 2020 and 34 per cent in 2022, and in crimes against Scheduled Tribes of 28.5 per cent in 2020).