Volume VIII, Issue III / 2026

Abstract. The Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022 recast a modest efficiency statute into the enabling framework for India’s first mandatory carbon market. In doing so it delegated to the executive not the implementation of a legislative choice but the choice itself: the emission-intensity trajectory, the supply of tradeable Carbon Credit Certificates, the price signal generated by compliance shortfalls, and the penalty architecture were all left to be fixed by subordinate instruments, several of them sub-delegated and one notified under a different parent statute. This article asks whether that delegation withstands constitutional scrutiny and, more usefully, where the real locus of judicial control now lies. It argues that India’s excessive-delegation doctrine, deliberately permissive since In re Delhi Laws Act, will almost certainly sustain the facial validity of the delegation, because the doctrine demands only discernible policy and guidance, which the Amendment’s climate objectives supply. The constitutionally significant questions therefore migrate downstream, to the review of the rules themselves, where Indian law remains under-theorised and its fora fragmented. Combining doctrinal analysis with a structured mapping of where each essential policy variable resides in the regulatory cascade, the article contends that market-constituting delegated instruments warrant a more exacting review than ordinary implementing rules; that procedural discipline (statutory consultation, reasoned response, and meaningful legislative laying) must supply the constraint that the delegation gateway does not; and that the Energy Conservation Act’s omission from Schedule I of the National Green Tribunal Act splits review of a single integrated instrument between the writ courts and the specialised environmental tribunal in a way that serves neither expertise nor coherence. Comparative reference to the United States’ major-questions doctrine and the European Union’s treatment of the Emissions Trading Scheme sharpens, without dictating, the prescription.

Abstract. Child criminology occupies a distinctive position within the broader discipline of criminology because children and adolescents who come into conflict with law cannot be understood merely through the conventional concept of criminal responsibility. Juvenile delinquency is influenced by a combination of individual, psychological, familial, social, economic and environmental circumstances. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 represents an important shift in Indian juvenile justice policy from a predominantly punitive understanding of juvenile offending towards a framework based on care, protection, development, rehabilitation, restoration and social reintegration. The Act recognises two principal categories of children: children in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection. It creates specialised institutions such as the Juvenile Justice Board, the Child Welfare Committee and the Children’s Court to respond to these categories through child-sensitive procedures. The Act also introduces a distinctive mechanism for children between sixteen and eighteen years of age alleged to have committed heinous offences, through a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board. At the same time, the legislative framework does not abandon the rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile justice. The concepts of the best interest of the child, institutional and non-institutional rehabilitation, foster care, adoption, restoration and individual care planning demonstrate the Act’s attempt to address the causes and consequences of juvenile offending. This article examines juvenile delinquency through major criminological theories, including classical, positivist, psychological, social learning, strain, social disorganisation, differential association, labelling and control theories. It then evaluates how these theoretical perspectives correspond with the institutional design and rehabilitative philosophy of the 2015 Act. The article argues that an effective juvenile justice system must understand offending behaviour as a developmental and social phenomenon and must balance accountability with the possibility of reform, while ensuring public safety and the dignity and rights of children.

Abstract. Deepfakes are synthetically generated information (SGI) that pose a fundamental challenge to the visual distinction between real and fake. According to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology’s FAQs on the 2026 amendment to the IT Rules, the advent of artificial intelligence (“AI”) has made it substantially easier “to create, generate, modify or alter highly realistic synthetic audio, visual and audio-visual content, including deepfakes, that can appear real, authentic or true and may mislead or deceive users.” It is therefore possible to give the deceptive impression that an individual has said, done, performed or endorsed something that never happened. Such information can be misused to cause serious harm through misinformation, impersonation, identity fraud, non-consensual intimate imagery, obscenity, child sexual exploitative and abuse material, reputational harm, coercion, extortion, privacy violations and the commercial exploitation of identity. The biggest challenge today is that there is no coherent substantive framework governing the underlying right to be protected against synthetic identity appropriation, and remedies are dispersed across various areas of law. India’s legal landscape has evolved partially through the IT Act, the IT Rules, the BNS, the DPDP Act, copyright law, passing-off principles, defamation law and constitutional privacy jurisprudence. Indian courts have also developed a body of personality-rights jurisprudence, particularly concerning celebrities. The regulatory position changed significantly in February 2026, when the IT Rules were amended to define and regulate “synthetically generated information,” including deepfakes. The amendments strengthen user awareness and accountability, expedite the takedown of illegal content, and introduce due diligence obligations requiring intermediaries to ensure labelling, provenance and technical verification for permissible SGI. They represent a significant pivot from purely reactive content moderation towards proactive platform regulation. Despite these reforms, a deeper substantive question remains unaddressed: what legal right does an individual possess over the digital reproduction, dissemination and manipulation of her or his identity? This paper proposes that India would benefit greatly from a technology-neutral framework that combines the 2026 intermediary regime for SGI with clear and codified digital personality rights, explicit protection against non-consensual synthetic intimate imagery, expedited victim remedies, proportionate obligations across the AI creation and distribution chain, robust provenance mechanisms, and balanced safeguards for satire, journalism, parody, political criticism and artistic expression, so that freedom of speech is not stifled.

Abstract. Those making bail, sentencing and parole decisions in common law jurisdictions have begun to rely more and more on algorithmic risk scores to predict recidivism as a way to make decisions that bear on a person’s freedom. This paper explores how algorithmic risk scores may be used in criminal justice decisions without violating due process, with a focus on the examples of the United States and India, one of which has witnessed litigation on algorithmic risk scoring, while the other has not. Using the methodologies of doctrinal and comparative research, the paper analyses constitutional case law from the United States, primarily State v. Loomis and the COMPAS risk assessment tool, and from India, particularly Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, in light of uses of predictive policing and facial recognition technology. The main argument put forward in the paper is that the present body of due process law in both jurisdictions is inherently unable to control algorithmic risk scoring, because this body of law rests on assumptions about an articulable and human chain of reasoning that the algorithms are unable to provide. Due process in jurisdictions where there has been litigation has remained thin and rhetorical at best: American courts have allowed proprietary risk assessment instruments to be taken into account in making liberty-infringing decisions, provided only that weak disclosure mechanisms are in place, without ever tackling the opacity problem. In India, where no litigation has taken place, lack of harm is not the reason for lack of litigation; rather, the lack of a forum, of a disclosure requirement, and of a litigant class concerned about its rights is the reason behind it.

Abstract. Sexual violence is one of the gravest crimes against humanity. Indian criminal law has stringent provisions against sexual violence, but they are narrowly centred on the idea that the perpetrator is a man and the victim a woman. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) defines rape as an act done by a man to a woman. This protection is necessary and must be retained. This article examines the existing framework of the BNS on sexual assault and the gap in a legislative framework that fails to provide dedicated provisions for male and transgender victims, especially after the omission of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The problem also lies in the wider system of reporting, policing, medical examination and trial, not only in statutory gaps. Safety for everyone needs reform of both laws and institutions. Securing the rights of men and transgender persons does not mean restraining the rights of women: gender-neutral rape laws, or victim-sensitive provisions, mean equal protection for every gender.

Abstract. Access to justice is a foundational promise of constitutional democracy, yet its realisation in practice remains deeply uneven. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms in India, including Lok Adalats, mediation and online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms, are widely celebrated for reducing court backlogs and offering faster, cheaper routes to dispute resolution. This paper interrogates that narrative by asking a more fundamental question: accessible to whom? Adopting a doctrinal and socio-legal methodology, it examines statutory frameworks, NALSA reports, relevant case law, and secondary data on ADR disposal rates and ODR usage patterns to assess whether India’s ADR system delivers equitable outcomes across lines of class, gender, caste and digital literacy. Four structural sites of inequity are examined. First, Lok Adalats are analysed for their tendency to prioritise speed over substantive fairness, raising concerns about settlements reached under time pressure without genuinely informed consent, particularly at the cost of economically weaker litigants. Second, mediation in matrimonial disputes is scrutinised for its failure to account adequately for power imbalances between spouses, which often disadvantages women whose bargaining position is weakened by social and economic dependence. Third, the shift toward ODR is evaluated against the reality of India’s digital divide, questioning whether platforms that presuppose English fluency and reliable internet access can be considered truly inclusive, especially for rural and semi-urban populations. Fourth, informal dispute resolution bodies are examined for their role in entrenching caste hierarchies rather than resolving disputes equitably, particularly where traditional power structures determine who is heard. The central argument is that efficiency cannot remain the sole metric for evaluating ADR. An equity-centred framework, one that interrogates not merely whether disputes are resolved but whether they are resolved fairly and for all, is both necessary and overdue. Concrete recommendations include facilitator training to recognise power imbalances, vernacular and offline alternatives for ODR, and meaningful oversight of informal dispute resolution forums.

Abstract. The digital economy is rapidly changing the way countries trade with one another, and this has changed the working of international trade: countries now have to include digital trade rules in the agreements they make with each other. However, there is no framework from the World Trade Organization, so these agreements are negotiated separately and can be confusing. Three important agreements contain such rules: the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement and the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. They can be compared in the following areas: how data is transferred across borders, where data is stored, how consumers are protected, how transparent companies must be about their source code and algorithms, whether digital products are taxed, and how disputes are resolved. The differences between these agreements lie not only in how they are written but also in the different views of the countries involved. The United States wants to make trade easier, the Asia-Pacific countries want flexibility, and India seeks to preserve its regulatory policy space and control over its own data. The India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement shows this, as India is cautious about committing to rules on data flows or data storage. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement is more flexible, while the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement takes its own approach. These differences show that digital trade rules concern not only technical details but also wider geopolitical issues. The many different digital trade rules are causing a problem: the rules are numerous and do not always agree with one another, so it is hard for businesses to know what to do. This is especially difficult for businesses in less wealthy countries, which often find it hard to refuse rules made by technologically advanced countries. The India-UAE agreement has gaps on the regulation of algorithms and the protection of the source code that makes software work, and it contains no enforceable rule on customs duties on electronic transmissions. These gaps matter because India is making new rules to protect personal data online. The study concludes that a clear model for digital trade, usable by all, is needed. It should draw on features of other agreements, such as the one between the United States, Mexico and Canada and those between the European Union and other countries, while ensuring that countries like India are treated fairly. The study also recommends efforts to bring all countries together on trade rules, which would make it easier for everyone to do business online, beginning with what the World Trade Organization has already done on this issue.

Abstract. The paper addresses digitalization as a global challenge, wherein cyber fraud, unrestricted by national boundaries, poses a major threat to global financial security. It categorizes digital threats into two types, cognitive manipulation and technological breaches. The primary focus of the paper is on cyber fraud falling under cognitive manipulation at the initial stage of financial transactions, and understanding how the internet helps criminals in money laundering operations, as well as how they utilize cryptocurrencies to their advantage. The paper conducts an in-depth study of cognitive manipulative traits that lead to cyber fraud victimization, and examines the subsequent flow of illegal money, including how criminals erase their digital footprints and disappear with illicit funds through cyber channels. The objective is to help devise a system that can protect potential victims and assist investigative agencies in curbing illegal money laundering activities. The main findings of the research include suggestions to incorporate the cost of protection based on the probability of susceptibility to cyber fraud, determined by cognitive traits, as well as the introduction of controls to verify the identity of individuals who receive and forward money. It also recommends blocking transactions in the absence of a traceable identity, along with other measures discussed in the paper.

Abstract. The emergence of cryptocurrencies, non-fungible tokens, stablecoins, and other digital assets has challenged traditional concepts of property and succession law. This article examines the manner in which Indian succession laws apply to digital assets and identifies the legal and practical difficulties that arise in their inheritance. Although digital assets may be treated as property capable of being inherited, existing succession frameworks do not adequately address issues relating to passwords, private keys, access mechanisms, contractual restrictions imposed by digital platforms, classification of digital assets, and privacy concerns. The article further examines comparative approaches adopted in the United States and Germany to address the succession of digital assets. Based on this analysis, it argues for a clearer legal framework in India that recognises digital assets as intangible property and establishes mechanisms for facilitating lawful access and transfer to legal heirs. The article concludes that Indian succession law must evolve to reconcile traditional principles of inheritance with the technological characteristics of digital assets and ensure that legally recognised inheritance rights are practically enforceable.

Abstract. India’s constitutional jurisprudence has moved decisively from the criminalisation of consensual same-sex intimacy towards recognition of dignity, privacy, autonomy and equal citizenship. Yet legal recognition of queer couples remains incomplete. In Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court declined to read the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in gender-neutral terms or to judicially create a legal status equivalent to marriage, while recognising the legitimacy of queer relationships and recording the Union’s undertaking to examine practical entitlements through a Cabinet Secretary-led committee. Review petitions were dismissed in January 2025. This article examines the resulting gap between constitutional recognition of queer persons and the statutory architecture of family law. It traces the doctrinal development from Naz Foundation, NALSA, Puttaswamy and Navtej Singh Johar to Supriyo; analyses consequences for adoption, surrogacy, succession and welfare entitlements; and compares India’s position with selected jurisdictions that adopted marriage equality through judicial and legislative routes. It argues that administrative measures can reduce immediate hardship but cannot substitute for a coherent legal status governing intimate partnerships. The article concludes that Parliament and State Legislatures should address the legal incidents of queer partnerships through carefully designed, rights-consistent legislation, while preserving the constitutional distinction between civil recognition and religious solemnisation.